The Pre coulda been a contender. Palm's low capital and cash burn
meant that even getting it to the starting line would take a great feat
by Jon Rubinstein's team. On top of that, making the Pre successful
would take near perfect marketing.
Unfortunately, Palm has taken to the Roger McNamee approach to
marketing: Burning bridges brings plenty of publicity. From his March 5
interview, "You know the beautiful thing: June 29, 2009, is the
two-year anniversary of the first shipment of the iPhone; not one of
those people will still be using an iPhone a month later."
Remarks like these had to be heavily qualified in an SEC submission
so the first 2009 share issue could be successful.
A Risky Choice
Using Apple's USB Vendor ID so that Pre's media sync works with the
current version of iTunes may have been useful for publicity, but it
has cut off the business sector as a source of sales. When the decision
by the USB Implementers Forum went against Palm, the alternative media
sync should have been rolled out.
Corporates don't look on this kind of behaviour as being clever.
Corporates buy standards. If they didn't, IBM and Microsoft would have
been in difficulty long ago.
IT departments always find objections to supporting a new platform
because it's more work for them, so one of the jobs of marketing is to
show the Pre isn't a risky choice. Using Apple's VID raises questions
in corporate minds of what other shortcuts Palm have taken, what else
hasn't it done right?
This leads to the obvious thought: Why support the Pre?
BlackBerry Gets It
Now compare the RIM approach. BlackBerry Media Sync uses the
documented XML file provided in iTunes, which is supported by Apple.
Maybe this is slightly less convenient for the user than the Pre
approach, but IT doesn't care.
Supporting music and media synching from iTunes is something IT
doesn't want to bother with. It doesn't want the IT Support Desk
fielding questions from users asking why they can no longer load music,
etc., on to their IT supplied Pre. So IT will push BlackBerry every
time, even if it doesn't yet have a great browser, and when there's a
need for an alternative, there's always that up-and-coming iPhone.
Sticking It to Palm/Treo Users
So all those businesses that bought Palm Pilots and then moved to
Treos - and all the managers and businessman who paid for them out of
their own pockets - are lost as customers. For Palm to cut itself off
from this major user base where there is no recognised Number 2
(Microsoft's Windows Mobile is uncompetitive, Nokia is nowhere in the
US, and the iPhone's success in business is limited) is an act of
complete stupidity.
Prices Slashed to Move Inventory
Pre sales are already suffering. Amazon started discounting to $99
and Walmart to $79 less than 100 days after launch. If the 11 weeks of
Pre channel inventory
found by Gerard Hallaren (TownHall Investment Research), is
anywhere near correct, Palm has run out of early adopters. That Palm
even found
375,000 up to the end of August is a testament to the Pre and the
lack of competitive offerings by Sprint.
Crossing the chasm from the early adopters to the mainstream is
always difficult, and Palm has blown its best opportunity.
There is still the prediction of going cash flow positive in
December to sustain Palm shares. The orders from O2 and Movistar in
Europe may be enough to make that happen. If so, it will be a blip in
the descent to Chapter 7 or 11.
The latest successful share issue will let Palm limp along for a
while longer and put out more press releases to add to the suicide
note, but bankruptcy court is an easy prediction for 2010.
Palm Pre Chronicles:
Palm Pre: Chronicle
of a death foretold, 2009.03.10. Palm is betting the company on Pre
and running out of cash. Can Palm survive in the face of the iPhone,
BlackBerry, and Android?
Palm Pre: Chronicle of a
death foretold, part 2, 2009.06.18. The Pre has had launch
problems, production problems, and needs to carve a niche against
established competitors. Don't hold your breath.
